The government`s interpretation of the agreement plays a good role among advocates who view the rebels as deceptive and capable operators, who use negotiations and agreements to reposition themselves before aspiring to further military gains. [fn] The group cites as an example the 2014 Peace and National Partnership Agreement (EPA), which called for a gradual withdrawal of Houthi troops from Sanaa in exchange for a series of political concessions, including the formation of a new government. After the signing of the agreement, the Houthis ignored the exit requirement and argued that the men at checkpoints in the streets were not their fighters, but supportive citizens from autonomous « people`s committees. » The Houthis propose a different version that suggests the slow pace of government formation, Hadi`s broken promise on shura reform (Advisory Council) and his attempt to pass a draft constitution based on a six-party federal division that the Houthis had rejected. In January 2015, the rebels placed Hadi under house arrest as their coup plunged an already divided country into a civil war. Crisis Group Middle East Report No.167, Yemen: Is Peace Possible?, 9 February 2016.Hide Footnote But it puts Hadi in the position of advocating for an outcome far from what the two sides agreed to in Sweden. [fn] While some government officials fear that the hawks will go too far, they also see the Stockholm agreement as a political responsibility for Hadi, whose legitimacy is fragile at best in Yemen. Hadi has regained support with his pushback against Griffiths. A government official said: « We were forced to make a deal that we didn`t want, and we can`t be forced to accept the worst version of the deal. Who would accept it? Crisis Group interview, Yemeni government official, New York, May 2019.Hide Footnote The backlash from the government`s, and Hadi`s own position, reflects the depth of their opposition to an agreement it was strong-armed by its regional allies to accepting. The government`s stance also suggests a continued desire to resume the battle for Hodeida as the better way to achieve its goals. Indeed, many on the government side still believe that a military victory is realistic; that it would significantly weaken the Houthis by depriving them of valuable customs revenue and a hub for arms smuggling; and that it would break the image of the Houthis` military superiority in the north, which would undermine the group`s ability to recruit among the tribes. [fn] Talks by the Crisis Group, senior Yemeni government officials, supporters of southern separatists, Aden, March 2019; Crisis Group Email Correspondence, anti-Houthi activists, a person with close ties to the GPC leadership, April and May 2019.Hide Footnote The commitments set out in the Stockholm agreement came in three parts: the Hodeidah agreement, the Taz agreement and a prisoner exchange agreement. Together, these companies have committed parties to (1) a ceasefire in the city of Hodeidah and in the ports of Hodeidah, Salif and Ras Issa, as well as the redistribution of troops on both sides;  (2) opening of humanitarian corridors for the flow of aid through these ports;  and (3) a prisoner exchange aimed at freeing more than 15,000 prisoners and detainees.
 The parties also agreed to conduct discussions on the creation of a humanitarian corridor for humanitarian assistance to Taz governorate.  – An immediate ceasefire is to enter into force in the city of Hodeidah, the ports of Hodeidah, Salif and Ras Issa and in the governorate after the signing of this agreement. We see the modest successes of the Stockholm Agreement in the fact that we are moving closer to achieving a lasting peace for all Yemenis.